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Increasingly, the question of whether some forms of research, such as human cloning, infringe 
notions of human dignity has been 
proposed as a primary justiﬁ cation for 
the development of science policy. 
This is understandable. A commitment 
to human dignity is a widely shared 
value and the foundation for our 
understanding of human rights. The 
preamble to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 
1948, states that “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice, and peace in the 
world” [1]. 
However, in the context of emerging 
scientiﬁ c advances, such as cloning 
technology and stem cell research, 
exactly how to judge whether human 
dignity is infringed upon or degraded is 
rarely explained. As an example, a 2002 
report by the President’s Council on 
Bioethics is titled “Human Cloning and 
Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry,” 
but it fails to conceptualize human 
dignity or address the speciﬁ c ways in 
which human cloning may impinge on 
human dignity [2]. 
This lack of clarity has the potential 
to hurt policymaking and, in the long 
run, degrade the possible substantive 
value of the principle of human dignity. 
The dilemma is that human dignity 
is a poorly conceptualized and vague 
concept. Further complicating matters, 
in a pluralistic society various groups 
and communities bring a diversity 
of worldviews, religious values, and 
cultural understandings that inform 
and shape their use of the concept of 
human dignity. 
The Concept of Dignity
There are numerous examples of 
policies that cite human dignity as a 
standard for dealing 
with controversial 
science issues. The 
UN Educational, 
Scientiﬁ c, and Cultural 
Organization’s 
“Universal Declaration 
on the Human 
Genome and Human 
Rights” recommends 
a ban on “practices 
which are contrary to 
human dignity, such as 
reproductive cloning” 
[3]. A 2003 World Health 
Organization report 
suggests that genetic 
databases create the 
need to balance “human 
dignity and human rights 
as against public health, 
scientiﬁ c progress and 
commercial interests 
in a free market” [4]. Both Japan’s 
2001 stem cell research guidelines and 
Canada’s recent legislation covering 
research involving human reproductive 
material claim the protection of human 
dignity as a primary objective of the 
regulatory regimes [5,6]. And, of 
course, the concept of human dignity 
permeates research ethics policy (e.g., 
the Helsinki Declaration). Canada’s 
primary research ethics document, the 
“Tri-Council Policy Statement,” declares 
that the “cardinal principle of modern 
research ethics, as discussed above, is 
respect for human dignity” [7]. 
In these documents, the concept 
of human dignity is often used in the 
conventional legal and ethical manner 
to emphasize the right of individuals to 
make autonomous choices. This is most 
apparent in the context of research 
ethics documents and informed-
consent policies. This conception 
treats human dignity as a means of 
empowerment. Some scholars have 
gone so far as to suggest that this is the 
only appropriate normative use of the 
idea of dignity [8]. 
Despite such claims, an alternative 
conception, dignity as a means of 
constraint, is increasingly common 
in the realm of science policy. 
Citations of human dignity in science 
policy discussions usually come in 
the context of concerns that some 
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activities, such as human cloning and 
the commodiﬁ cation of human tissue, 
infringe some basic understanding 
of dignity [9]. Costa Rica’s recent 
proposal to the UN for an international 
treaty banning cloning stands as a good 
example of this trend. The Costa Rican 
draft convention sought to “ensure 
respect for the dignity and basic rights 
of the human being” in the face of 
the “threat posed by experiments 
in the cloning of human beings” 
[10]. Likewise, in the area of stem 
cell research, opponents refer to the 
dignity implications as a rationale for 
limiting research on human embryos. 
In Europe, it is an underpinning of 
the “ordre public” (public policy) 
restriction of patent law, which has 
been used to deny patents on cloning 
technologies and human embryonic 
stem cells [11]. 
When used in this manner, dignity 
is meant to reﬂ ect a broad social or 
moral position that a particular type of 
activity is contrary to public morality 
or the collective good. It is not used 
as a source of individual rights, but as 
a justiﬁ cation for a policy response—
usually a policy that is intended to 
curtail a given activity. 
While most would agree that human 
dignity is closely tied to the idea of 
the inherent worth of humans, policy 
documents and legal instruments 
rarely provide an explicit deﬁ nition 
of dignity or how human worth might 
be degraded by a given technology 
or scientiﬁ c activity. “[Dignity’s] 
intrinsic meaning has been left to 
intuitive understanding, conditional, 
in large measure, by cultural factors” 
[12]. As such, its meaning will be very 
different depending on the values 
and background that an individual or 
community brings to the deliberations.
Problems with “Dignity” 
Why is this lack of clarity problematic? 
At worst, the concept of dignity 
appears to often be used as mere 
rhetorical dressing, adding little 
more to the policy debate than the 
weight or cachet of the concept. In 
such circumstances, dignity conveys 
a sense of general social unease, but 
with little explanation of how, exactly, 
human dignity is threatened. At times, 
reference to human dignity seems to 
have emerged, inappropriately, as a 
politically palatable articulation of the 
“yuck factor”—a way of “registering 
our concern” about activities that 
seem to threaten “those parts of the 
human condition that are familiar and 
reassuringly ‘human,’” without the 
detailed explanation of why and how 
the activities are troubling [13]. 
The use of dignity as a policy 
justiﬁ cation can silence open debate, 
and may serve to blur an understanding 
of the real policy concerns behind 
a given technological innovation or 
scientiﬁ c development. Moreover, 
without a clearer conception of human 
dignity and its requirements, it is not 
possible to evaluate technological 
innovation or scientiﬁ c developments 
in the service of protecting human 
dignity.
In addition, because human dignity 
is viewed as a foundational concept, 
its use may imply a degree of social 
consensus that simply does not exist. 
If something is said to infringe human 
dignity, one would expect a degree 
of agreement that this is so. However, 
modern societies are often pluralistic, 
and in pluralistic societies, consensus 
is often difﬁ cult to obtain, whether 
about human dignity or other complex 
social and ethical issues introduced by 
scientiﬁ c innovations [14]. There is not 
even agreement about the foundation 
of human dignity—whether it is faith-
based or secular—let alone what 
human dignity entails. In the debate 
on stem cell research, for example, 
not all agree on the moral status of 
the embryo and, as such, they cannot 
reach agreement on the degree to 
which embryonic stem cell research 
challenges human dignity. 
As a result, the use of dignity will 
not necessarily represent a broadly 
accepted social value, but, instead, it 
may express a particular worldview—a 
worldview that may not even reﬂ ect 
the majority opinion. In the context 
of legal instruments and policy 
documents, the use and content 
of human dignity may amount to a 
“political compromise informed by 
cultural, political, constitutional and 
other conditions, all of which can 
then evolve and change” [15]. In 
more extreme circumstances, it could 
involve “intolerant voices (whether 
of the majority or of an inﬂ uential 
minority) expressing negative attitudes 
about certain practices, which attitudes 
are then translated into restrictions 
ostensibly in the interest of respect for 
human dignity” [9]. 
The Value of Human Dignity 
to Science Policy
For the reasons cited above, we need 
to be cautious not to simply accept 
the concept of human dignity as a 
primary or sole justiﬁ cation for science 
policy. As noted by Hayry, “ethical 
controversies cannot be settled simply 
by stating that this or that solution 
respects or violates human dignity” 
[16]. 
Nevertheless, despite the concerns 
that have been articulated about the 
recent constraining and vague use of 
dignity in science policy, we believe 
that it remains a potentially useful 
normative concept. Indeed, the fact 
that the concept of human dignity 
“anchors different worldviews” may, 
paradoxically, be its greatest policy 
value. Most, if not all, agree that human 
dignity is tied to notions of human 
worth [15]. As such, a pronouncement 
that something infringes human dignity 
should be viewed as an opportunity 
to debate the values at play and the 
cultural underpinnings of the concern. 
Hayry concludes thus: “People can 
debate the merits of different notions 
of dignity, and they can argue the 
relative signiﬁ cance of opposing 
concepts in ethical disputes. Although 
it is probably true that dignity should 
never be used as a mere means, 
the concept of dignity could in this 
way be used as a means to further 
understanding between people and 
cultures” [16]. 
The key to its constructive use, 
however, is that dignity be used as a 
facilitator of policy debate, instead 
of a “door closer.” This means the 
concept of human dignity should not 
be used as a slogan or as part of a 
mere assertion of harm. It also means 
that when human dignity is used as 
a grounding for science policy—be 
it as a justiﬁ cation for empowerment 
or technological constraint—as 
much speciﬁ city as possible should 
be provided. For example, how does 
cloning technology challenge the 
intrinsic worth of humans? Is it the 
At worst, the concept 
of dignity appears to 
often be used as mere 
rhetorical dressing.
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mere replication of nucleic DNA 
or something else? Do the dignity 
concerns about stem cell research go 
beyond disputes about the moral status 
of the embryo? 
We believe that the close connection 
to the notion of human worth 
differentiates it from mere “intuitive” 
responses to a technology and, as 
such, should force an articulation of 
the way in which various communities 
view the foundations of human nature 
and worth. In a pluralistic society, this 
may require exploring the various 
approaches to dignity in different 
cultures and communities. 
Finally, communities will need to 
consider how our community-speciﬁ c 
conceptions of dignity relate to broader 
regulatory policy. It may be difﬁ cult to 
develop a law or policy that can respect 
the diverse conceptions of human 
dignity, as highlighted by the divisive 
nature of the stem cell debate. But by 
using the concept of human dignity 
as an avenue for exploring differing 
philosophical approaches, we promote 
transparency, encourage dialogue, and 
help to avoid the simplistic application 
of dignity in science policy. 
Conclusion
The issues being raised about the 
impact of scientiﬁ c discoveries and 
new technologies on human dignity 
make it imperative to gain greater 
understanding about the meanings 
and requirements of this important but 
elusive concept. Otherwise, references 
to dignity will likely be ineffectual 
and potentially even a source of 
social division. Moreover, the one 
goal that all groups may agree upon, 
the importance of protecting human 
dignity, will never be achieved. 
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